

























The role of the military in the area of strategic advice and deci-
sion-making — particularly the role played by the Joint Chiefs of Staff —
is an issue which has caused considerable debate since the creation of
the JCS as a formal body. Presidents, scholars, politicians and laymen
have disagreed sharply over exactly what the role should be, and how in-
fluential the military has been in that role.
Many scholars, journalists, and research foundations, for example,
believe that the military has become increasingly influential and that
this excessive influence constitutes a serious threat to our democratic
processes. Lasswell, in discussing the threat in what he calls the
"garrison state", warns:
that even if we avoid another war, a more insidious menace is that
the conditions of continuing crisis may undermine and eventually
destroy free institutions.
Senator George McGovern expressed the opinion that this threat has
already become a reality, commenting in 1969:
Now that the American destiny is safely in the hands of the
military-industrial complex, we wake to a new decade.
Many prominent writers on military affairs are also worried about
the balance of civilian-military relations. Their worry, however, is that
the civilians have taken over the military. The following statements are
illustrative of this feeling:
Robert Lasswell, National Security and Individual Freedom (New York, 1950),
p. 23.
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George McGovern, Interview in Esquire (Vol. 73 , December, 1969), p. 189.

The Secretary (Secretary McNaraara) has penetrated deep into fields
once reserved for the military. He has barked shins throughout
the country's polity and economy .. .The professional military
leadership of the nation is being short-circuited in the current
decision-making process at the Pentagon.
3
In common with many other military men, active and retired, I am
profoundly apprehensive of the pipe-smoking, tree-full-of-owls
type of so-called professional defense intellectuals who have been
brought into this nation's Capitol... It seems to me that the old
strengths apply. In my opinion, the two that count for most in the
nuclear space age, regardless of academic cerebrations, are national
determination and military forces designed to achieve military
victory, not tailored to obtain compromise.^
A noted historian has observed:
Again and again, military men have seen themselves hurled into war
by the ambitions, passions and blindness of civilian governments,
almost wholly uninformed as to the limits of their military poten-
tial and almost recklessly indifferent to the requirements of the
war they let loose. ->
Obviously, from this sampling of statements, one can conclude that
there is no lack of support for either of two diametrically opposed opin-
ions. On the one hand is the belief that the influence in policy-making
is overwhelmingly civilian; on the other is the belief that it is over-
whelmingly military.
Similarly, there have been widely differing opinions concerning what
the proper relationship between civilian and military should be in the
decision-making process. Each President, as Commander-in-Chief, has seen
his military leaders in a slightly different role and has used them accor-
dingly. President Truman, for example, in addition to using his military
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Jack Kraft, "McNamara and His Enemies", Harper's Magazine (August, 1961),
p. 41.
Thomas White, "Strategy and Defense Intellectuality", Saturday Evening
Post (May 4, 1963), pp. 10-12.
Alfred Vagts, The History of Militarism (London, 1938), p. 33.

leaders as advisers, capitalized on their prestige and public popularity
which carried over from WWII and used his chiefs to a large degree in an
advocacy role, "merchandising" foreign policy such as the Truman Doctrine,
and containment. General Omar Bradley, Truman's Chairman of the JCS, made
fifty-seven public appearances before Congress, civilian groups and over
radio and television in which he discussed the important issues of mili-
tary policy. Moreover, he delivered the classic exposition of the Truman
military policy in his "Gibraltar" speech and frequently made broad state-
ments on foreign policy.
President Eisenhower, by comparison, was considerably more restric-
tive in his view of the role of the JCS. Because of his five star rank
and his personal popularity, Eisenhower had less need than Truman for
support from the military either in the merchandising of policy or as
military advisers in the strategic decision-making process. President
Eisenhower viewed his Chiefs as members of a team which, to a large degree,
should act as a rubber stamp, endorsing strategic decisions handed down
by the President.
During the Indo-China crisis in 1954, the crises over the Chinese
offshore islands, Suez, Hungary, and renewed Soviet threats in Berlin, he
showed a large degree of independence in the adoption of courses of ac-
tion. The Eisenhower administration wanted agreement ; not advocacy,
from the JCS.
Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the State , (Cambridge, 1959),
p. 398.
Dwight Eisenhower, The White House Years: Mandate for Change (New York,
1963), pp. 88-89.

While the role of the JCS varied somewhat during the Truman and
Eisenhower administrations, the conflict and uncertainty surrounding the
role of the JCS seemed to reach a peak in the 1960's. During the Kennedy
and Johnson administrations the influence and prestige of the JCS reached
its lowest point since becoming an institutionalized body. The Nixon
administration, by contrast, has reversed the deteriorating Presidential-
JCS relationship.
It will be the aim of this paper, therefore, to examine the relation-
ship between the office of the President and the JCS in an effort to
determine what role the military should play, and what role they have
played in the decision-making process; and because of its sharp contrasts,
the period selected for examination will be the Kennedy-Johnson-Nixon
administrations. Prior to this task, however, it will be necessary to
examine the military's own view of its proper function and then compare
this definition with actual practices. Although there is no precise
definition of the JCS role, it is nevertheless axiomatic that effective
strategic planning and coordination cannot be achieved without some agree-
ment between the President and his uniformed military advisers over the
proper role of the professional military in the strategic decision-making
process.
MODEL RELATIONSHIP
Today in Vietnam the U.S. finds itself in a unique position; it is
withdrawing from a conflict whose outcome is still very much in doubt.
This has never happened before in American history. It may be a long
time before historians will be able to judge the correctness of the
policies pursued by the United States in Southeast Asia, but already

many aspects of the war have been widely debated and, inevitably, some of
the questions relate to the conduct of the war as a possible explanation
for its excessive cost and duration. Was military force inappropriate to
attain the national goals in this instance? Was force improperly used?
Was our strategy correct? Were our tactics sound?
By law, "...the Joint Chiefs of Staff are the principal military
advisers to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary
o
of Defense." Did the JCS provide sound or unsound advice? Did the
President listen to their advice?
The answers to the last two questions will be a long time coming.
More Presidential papers will have to be made available, volumes of docu-
ments will have to be declassified, and books and memoirs will have to be
written before the answers can be found. However, it is possible to
examine the environment in which the JCS operated during the Kennedy and
Johnson administrations in order to assess their collective influence
upon the formulation of policy involving the use of the Armed Forces and
to examine the change of environment created by the Nixon administration.
Before beginning an inquiry of this sort, a norm or reference for
comparison must be established which describes the relationship between
the President and the leaders of the military services. Then the inter-
actions of past Presidents and their Chiefs can be rated. Certain aspects
of this model relationship are widely supported, such as civilian control
over the military, and the military's advisory function. However, this
g
National Security Act of 1947 (as amended) , in Keith Clark and Laurence
Legere (eds), The President and the Management of National Security
(New York, 1969), p. 263.

support of civilian control has not been held to mean that the military
forfeit its advisory role in the policy-making process.
The model relationship chosen comes from a book first published by
the U.S. Naval War College in 1936 called "Sound Military Decisions".
This book was used for years to enlarge the viewpoint and broaden the
basis of the professional judgment of officers. Based on an enormous
body of literature which included all available and pertinent military
writings, "Sound Military Decisions" became a "bible" to students at the
Naval War College prior to Pearl Harbor and throughout World War II. Al-
though it has never been incorporated into any official directives, it is
considered to be an accurate reflection of the military's philosophy con-
cerning military input to strategic decision-making.
What influence the following passage from "Sound Military Decisions"
had upon the drafters of the Act of Congress which made the Joint Chiefs
of Staff "the principal military advisers to the President, the National
9
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Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense" is unknown, but given
its general acceptance among the military services, as well as the fact
that it predates the National Security Act of 1947, it is used in this
paper as the basis for the model relationship.
Understanding between the Civil representatives of the State and
the leaders of the Armed Forces is manifestly essential to the
coordination of national policy with the power to enforce it.
Therefore, if serious omissions and the adoption of ill-advised
measures are to be avoided, it is necessary that wise professional
counsel be available to the State. While military strategy may
determine whether the aims of policy are possible of attainment,
policy may, beforehand, determine largely the success or failure




military strategy pursue appropriate aims, but that the work of
strategy be allotted adequate means and be undertaken under the
most favorable conditions. 10
Looking at the last twelve years, there are all sorts of questions
which can be asked in the light of the model -relationship described above.
One can question the amount of understanding which existed between the
civilian and military sectors; the wisdom of the advice offered, the means
allotted to support that strategy, and the conditions in which the strat-
egy was undertaken. While the attempt to answer any of these questions
would be equally interesting and worthwhile, it will be the aim of this
paper to examine the degree of understanding which existed between the
office of the President and the JCS in the Kennedy and Johnson adminis-
trations and to comment on the changing relationship evident in the Nixon
administration.
JFK and the JCS
When John F. Kennedy became President of the- United States, two fac-
tors were to have a substantial impact on the professional military es-
tablishment: his preconceptions about the military, and his Secretary of
Defense, Robert McNamara. Before the first 100 days in office, the
President came to depend on Mr. McNamara for military advice and signifi-
cantly changed the relationship between the office of .the President and
the JCS. His own experiences as a naval officer left him unawed by the
generals and admirals who were to work for him. In 1944, while recovering
from wounds he had received when he was the Commander of PT 109, he wrote
to a friend concerning the
U.S. Naval War College, Sound Military Decisions (Newport, R.I. , 1942),
p. 9.

superhuman ability of the Navy to screw up everything they touch...
Even the simple delivery of a letter frequently overburdens this
heaving, puffing war machine of ours. God save this country of
ours from those patriots whose war cry is 'What this country needs
is to be run with military efficiency'
.
How much this attitude remained with him until 1960 is unknown, but
regardless of what his personal views of the military may have been, he
always took a keen interest in military affairs. He once commented that
there were only two posts in the Cabinet which he would consider —
12Secretary of State or Secretary of Defense. Later, as President, he
took great interest in his role as Commander-in-Chief, frequently inspec-
ting military bases and leading investigations into such fields as counter-
insurgency, and flexible response. Moreover, it appears that he came into
office well disposed to the military, specifically the JCS. He had
become convinced that the Eisenhower administration had undercut the
military posture in favor of balancing the budget, and had expressed a
13desire to provide the military leaders with greater access to the President.
One of the major planks in Kennedy's Presidential campaign platform
was the concern that the U.S. was falling behind the U.S.S.R. in usable
military power and that the strategy of massive retaliation was unrealistic,
leaving the U.S., in effect, two courses of action — worldwide devasta-
14
tation or submission. Prompted by his concern for the state of the




Adam Yarmolinsky, The Military Establishment (New York, 1971), p. 123.
14
Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days (Boston, Mass., 1965),
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national defense, he conducted a fairly extensive talent hunt to find a
man who would make a strong Secretary of Defense, someone who could unify
the efforts of the Department of Defense and especially the armed ser-
vices. This search ended at Ford Motor Company and Robert S. McNamara.
Characterized by the military as the "civilian on horseback", Mr.
McNamara accepted the post offered by President-elect Kennedy with very
specific ideas concerning how he would go about getting control of the
Department of Defense.
When I became Secretary of Defense in 1961, I felt that either of
two broad philosophies of management could be followed by the man
at the head of this great establishment. He could play an essen-
tially passive role — a judicial role. In this role the Secretary
would make the decisions required of him by law by approving re-
commendations made to him. On the other hand, the Secretary of
Defense could play an active role providing aggressive leadership —
questioning, suggesting alternatives, proposing objectives and
stimulating progress. This active role represents my own philosophy
of management. I became convinced that there was room for and need
of this kind of management philosophy in the Department of Defense. J
Immediately after McNamara' s acceptance of the post of Secretary of
Defense, President-elect Kennedy requested him to conduct a comprehensive
survey of the Department of Defense. Shortly after the inauguration,
McNamara submitted the results of his survey. That part of the report
which dealt with the effectiveness of the armed services stressed the
vulnerability of the strategic nuclear forces to surprise missile attack,
a non-nuclear force weak in combat-ready divisions, in airlift capacity
and in tactical air support, a counterinsurgency force which, for all
practical purposes, was non-existent, and a weapons inventory which was
dangerously understocked in some elements, and greatly overstocked in
others.
Robert McNamara, "McNamara Defines His Job", New York Times Magazine
(April, 1964), p. 108.
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There were many "canned" or contingency decisions which were prepared
in advance with little capability or thought of up-dating them to meet
an actual emergency. The mobility of the Army depended on the rapid air-
lift capability of the Air Force, which the Air Force did not have. The
Air Force supply lists were based on the premise that any subsequent war
would last a few days, while the Army was stockpiling for two years.
President Kennedy's suspicion had been reinforced. Although he had
come into the office of the President with the impression that the JCS
had merely been carrying out the Eisenhower-Dulles strategy — making do
with a budget ceiling imposed by President Eisenhower, it is doubtful
that he was favorably impressed with the evidence of lack of coordination
and understanding between the various services.
Concerning the JCS members, the President regarded them as vestiges
of the Eisenhower administration, despite the fact that the Chiefs had an
apolitical institutional history and had been equally loyal to Democrats
and Republicans alike. Kennedy obviously wanted to appoint his own JCS,
remarking that "Any President should have the right to choose carefully
his own military advisers".
However, despite the adverse report submitted by McNamara, and his
own personal feelings, he appeared to be willing to let normal attrition
change the membership of the JCS. He had already brought General Maxwell
Taylor out of retirement to act as his personal military adviser until the






The crisis precipitated by the Bay of Pigs, however, caused Kennedy to
18
mistrust the competence and judgment of the Chiefs.
It is not the purpose' of this paper to consider all the aspects of
the events surrounding the Bay of Pigs episode, however, this unfortunate
event could be viewed as a turning point in Presidential-JCS relations
and for that reason certain aspects of the Bay of Pigs merit examination.
Although Kennedy's appraisal of the JCS had not been the highest before
the Bay of Pigs, he had used them in their traditional or model role as
military advisers. Having lost a great deal of confidence in his Chiefs
as a consequence of the Cuban disaster, President Kennedy chose to use
Secretary McNamara and a number of "ad hoc" advisers for his military ad-
vice and practically ignored the JCS. This pattern of poor communications
was evident before the Bay of Pigs and intensified during and after its
occurrence and was a major factor in the deterioration of civil-military
relations at the highest levels.
From the outset, the Chiefs were not happy about the CIA conducting
large-scale military operations, and, in my opinion, understandably so.
The Chiefs held the project at arm's length and only commented on the
feasibility, or availability of necessary men and materials, when required
to do so.
In this regard, the Chiefs had commented in January, 1961, that
success of the CIA plan to land at Trinidad had a chance of initial mili-






uprising within the island or substantial outside support. The Chiefs
were subsequently criticized by Kennedy advisers for the ambiguous stance
they took in the pre-invasion planning. Arthur Schlesinger, for example,
commented that the JCS position paper, without restating the underlying
assumptions for victory, merely concluded that the plan as proposed had
20
a fair chance for success if it could be executed in time. The JCS
clarified their position in March of 1961, however, repeating their pre-
vious statement that native Cuban resistance was indispensable for a
successful invasion. They could see no way short of direct -American in-
tervention in which the Brigade, finally numbering about 2500 men, could
possibly overcome the 200,000 army and militia of Cuba, no matter how well
21
motivated, trained and equipped they might be.
As the planning continued, Kennedy instructed his advisers to assume
a decreased American involvement in the operation. Consequently, new
courses of action were sought. The JCS were asked to comment on the
suitability of various landing sites, including the Bay of Pigs and
Zapata. On March 14, the Chiefs agreed that Zapata would be the better
landing site, but they still preferred the original plan calling for a
22landing at Trinidad.*
*There is some disagreement concerning whether the Chiefs did in fact re-
assert their claim that they preferred the original landing site. Ted
Sorensen claims that they did not. However, the Bay of Pigs, which was
the JCS' third choice was ultimately selected. -*
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Although the JCS had made it quite clear that an internal uprising
was essential for the success of the plan, the CIA personnel who were in
charge of the operation made their preparations without counting on an
uprising and had never collected any intelligence estimates concerning
the possibility of such an uprising. The invasion plan, as understood by
both the President and the JCS, assumed that, immediately after the es-
tablishment of an enlarged beachhead, armed members of the Cuban resis-
tance would organize and spearhead the internal uprising. The CIA ap-
parently had a different viewpoint. Allen Dulles, former Director of the
CIA, states in his book, "The Craft of Intelligence",
I know of no estimate that a spontaneous uprising of the unarmed
population of Cuba would be touched off by the landing. 24
The planning continued without these gaps in communcations even being
resolved, and, if anything, they became more numerous. The CIA represen-
tatives dominated the planning meetings and the Joint Chiefs assumed a
position of institutional correctness which, in the extreme, can amount
to insubordination or even sabotage. The planning body met as a group
four times after March 15th to update and review plans. The preference
of the Chiefs for the landing at Trinidad was on record, and they, at no
time, formally approved the new plan. Technically they had performed
their roles as military advisers. They did not, however, at any of these
four meetings oppose the new plan. This lack of opposition gave the
White House an impression of collaboration between the CIA and the JCS,






But what about the mutual trust and understanding between the Comman-
der-in-Chief and his military leaders, as described in the model relation-
ship? It is rather unsettling to think that a government could proceed
on such a hazardous and crucial course of action assuming the consensus
of the planning staff. Or that the President could even assume this
consensus when the JCS had repeatedly stated their preconditions for suc-
cess. The point here is not to try to fix the blame for the failure of
the Bay of Pigs operation on one office or another, but to ask how such
misunderstanding could have occurred. One is tempted to speculate whether
this same situation could have occurred if the National Security Council
machinery had been used as it had been in the Eisenhower administration.
Concerning the JCS participation in the operation, there is very
little other than speculation which can be said. Numerous leading mili-
tary officers who were directly involved in the Bay of Pigs operations
studiously avoid any comment concerning JCS participation, other than the
"correct" utterances concerning loyalty to the President and their oaths
of office.*
How could there be such a lack of understanding between the Commander-
in-Chief and his dedicated and experienced military leaders? The Presi-
dent was confident that the JCS would not let him undertake a course of
^Several generals and admirals, speaking to Armed Forces Staff College
student body from January 1971 to June 1971 were asked various questions
concerning JCS participation in the Bay of Pigs and invariably the an-





of action which would lead to disaster, and yet he seemed to either mis-
understand or ignore the various preconditions for success and the advice
that the plan would have to be executed boldly and forcefully. It is
possible that the JCS believed the President to be personally pushing for
the covert CIA invasion since the plan would not die a bureaucratic death
even after all the preconditions and reservations raised by the JCS. Per-
haps the JCS wanted to show the President that they could in fact get
along with the CIA, and that they were not just parochial nitpickers.
The hard intelligence relative to the invasion was difficult for
the Chiefs to acquire since the CIA was so secretive about the details.
Rather than briefings on formal operations plans, the Chiefs were given
presentations concerning the operations. This approach did not permit
the Chiefs to thoroughly scrutinize the plan nor tc append formal recom-
mended changes. As an example, the changes urged by Kennedy's advisers
which cancelled 40 of the 48 planned air strokes were unknown to the JCS
27
until the last minute. Dr. Mario Lazo, former leader of the anti-Castro
underground inside Cuba stated that the final plan which the JCS had not
opposed was changed at the insistence of the President's advisers without
the knowledge of the JCS and that these changes doomed the invasion before
it ever got started.
Lyman Kirkpatrick, former Deputy Director of the CIA and at the time
of the Bay of Pigs, Inspector General of the CIA, found no fault with the







Throughout the rest of Washington, after the Bay of Pigs, there
was a general effort to try and move out of the hot seat and put
somebody else in it. There were those that tried unjustly to blame
the Defense Department and Joint Chiefs of Staff, whose participa-
tion had been limited. °
When it was over, regardless of who was .to blame, the President and
the country had been embarrassed, and obviously many mistakes had been
made and many people shared in the blame. Publicly, President Kennedy
assumed all the blame, but in the company of his personal confidants, he
expressed a great disappointment in the performance of his advisers. He
then proceeded to replace those individuals who he felt had failed him.
He could not conduct an immediate purge, mostly for political reasons, but
eventually all those who he suspected had failed him were either removed
or their functions replaced by organizations of his own making.
President Kennedy's public acceptance of the blame for the failure
did not stop the attack on the JCS, however. Senator Gore called for the
29dismissal of the entire JCS. Senator Long called for the removal of
30General Lemnitzer. Secretary McNamara did nothing to clarify the JCS
role in the ill-fated invasion. President Kennedy did pick this time,
however, to pose with the JCS in the Rose Garden at the White House for
31
an official picture which was accompanied with unusually heavy publicity.
Finally, in June, 1961, former President Eisenhower came to their defense,
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which for all practical purposes, ended the attack on ' the JCS from out-
32
side the administration.
Throughout these attacks, the President made no public denouncement
of his Chiefs, although in private he is quoted as having been extremely
derogatory toward them. These comments reflect an attitude which carried
through his administration, and whether or not he actually said them, the
impression that he had said them affected the attitude of his civilian
advisers and other members of his administration. Schlesinger, for exam-
ple, reports:
The President reserved his innermost thoughts and, in the end,
blamed only himself. But he was a human being and not totally free
of resentment. He would say at times, 'My God, the bunch of ad-
visers we inherited. .. can you imagine being President and leaving
behind someone like all those people here?' My impression is that,
among these advisers, the Joint Chiefs had disappointed him most
for their cursory review of the military plans."
The President felt that he knew where the weak spots were in his
administration and that he would never again trust the professional mili-
tary advice of the holdover Chiefs of Staff. A full year and a half
later, Sorensen reports the President as saying that the advice of every
member of his executive staff regarding the Cuban episode was unanimous
and the advice was all wrong. Sorensen reflects, however, that the ad-
vice was not nearly so well considered nor unanimous as the President
might have imagined. The Chiefs of Staff, whose only inputs, meager as
they were, were primarily concerned only with the feasibility of the plan,
addressed the suitability and acceptibility little or not at all. More-
32
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over, there had been no comprehensive study of the plan by the Chiefs as
a body and individually they differed concerning some of the plan's
features. Since the plan belonged to the CIA, it appears that the Chiefs
34
were not as critical of its features as they might normally have been.
If the President and the White House staff felt that they had
learned some hard lessons, the lesson was obviously not lost on the JCS,
and they reacted in their own way to the Cuban fiasco. It began to appear
to the White House that the Chiefs were earnestly building a record which
would permit them to say that whatever the President did was in opposition
35
to their advice. Thus, returning to the model relationship, if mutual
understanding, trust, and respect are essential to achieving the proper
relationship between a President and his military advisers, the JCS as
an institution was now defunct for all intents and purposes. Under such
circumstances, the Chiefs could hardly perform their proper advisory role
in strategic decision-making.
Obviously, the President of the United States cannot carry out his
duties as Commander-in-Chief without professional military advice, and
President Kennedy recognized this. Having lost confidence in the JCS,
the President felt it was necessary to look for military counsel else-
where. The President had long been an admirer of General Maxwell Taylor.
General Taylor's credentials were impressive. He had compiled an out-
standing combat record. Personally he was urbane and sophisticated and
was considered by many to be an intellectual.






become dissatisfied with the decreased role of the Army in the massive
retaliation strategy, and had retired from his position of Chief of Staff
of the Army. In his book, "The Uncertain Trumpet", which was written in
his interim retirement, General Taylor attacked the doctrine of massive
retaliation and called for a posture of flexible response. Kennedy had
read Taylor's book and had been impressed with Taylor's thinking, and even
before the Bay of Pigs, had brought him to the White House as his personal
36
adviser.
On 30 September, 1962, General Lemnitzer turned over the Chairmanship
of the JCS to General Taylor and departed for Europe and NATO. With Gen-
eral Decker's retirement from the Army on the same day, all the Eisenhower
Chiefs had been replaced with the exception of General Shoup, Commandant
of the Marine Corps, who, of all the Eisenhower Chiefs, had been Kennedy's
37favorite. General Curtis LeMay had become USAF Chief of Staff in June,
1961, and Admiral George Anderson assumed the role of Chief of Naval Op-
erations in August, 1961. Now that President Kennedy had his own team of
military advisers, the relationship between the Commander-in-Chief and his
military leaders would hopefully return more closely to the model rela-
tionship set forth earlier. Unfortunately, the events of the Cuban mis-
sile crisis specifically, and the interposition of the Secretary of Defense
generally, did little to improve the stature of the JCS.
Early in his administration, Kennedy had instructed his Chiefs to






38broad gagued political and economic factors as well." The model rela-
tionship, while considering the relation between policy aims and strategy,
does not permit the military to attempt to determine national policy.
Accordingly, if the President were to ask the JCS about the propriety of
the U.S. using force to accomplish its foreign policy aims, it would be
improper for the military to answer in an official capacity.
Considering the model, the only questions to which the military Chiefs
could legitimately address themselves in the Cuban missile crisis would
be those concerning the military means available to counter the missile
threat, the courses of action available, the most promising course of
action, and the cost of the course of action in terms of men and materials.
However, the desire of the President to have the military broaden their
horizons was clearly evident in some of the high-level deliberations which
took place in conjunction with the Cuban missile crisis. Robert Kennedy
recalls that the President was disappointed in the military, General Tay-
lor excepted, in that they seemed to give very little consideration to
the overall implications of their recommendations. He was irritated be-
cause they could not look beyond the military field. President Kennedy
assumed that the military had been trained to do nothing more than wage
war and that they had little appreciation for anything else. Consequently,
for these reasons and others, he considered Secretary McNamara as the
39
most valuable member of his administration.
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(of Cuba) would have been a mistake — a wrong use of our power. But the
military are mad. They wanted to do this. It's lucky for us that we have
McNamara over there." Sorensen recalls another occasion in October, 1962,
in which the President expressed disgust with the JCS for favoring an air
41
strike or an invasion in Cuba. It may be noted parenthetically that
the better course of action will probably never be determined. There has
never been an on-site inspection to insure that all the missiles were ac-
tually removed, and one can point to the possible existence of a Soviet
missile submarine base at Cienfuegos in 1970 as an argument against the
President's decision in 1962. Would more aggressive action such as an
invasion precipitated a nuclear exchange? Doubtful, but it will probably
never be known.
None of those who have written about the high-level conferences re-
lating to the Cuban missile crisis expressed any disappointment with the
performance of General Taylor who had just assumed the Chairmanship of the
JCS. Neither Robert Kennedy, Schlesinger, nor Sorensen reveal what Gen-
eral Taylor had to say, but it must have satisfied the President.
While the Chiefs, with the exception of General Taylor, were criti-
cized for being too belligerent in their recommended courses of action,
they were praised for the manner in which the quarantine was conducted and
the rapid response of all ground and air forces. Ironically, it was
during the enforcement of the naval blockade that Admiral Anderson clashed








When Admiral Anderson joined the JCS on 1 August, 1961, he was the
"new boy". The others, Lemnitzer, Decker, White and Shoup had been on
board for some time. Aggressive and energetic, he immediately developed
several issues he wanted to discuss with Secretary McNamara and the JCS
in executive session. The older members who had had their share of fric-
tion with the Secretary apparently welcomed the opportunity to let Admiral
Anderson absorb a little of the heat, and encouraged him to speak out.
He found it difficult- to disguise his lack of enthusiasm for the
"whiz kids" and other non-professional advisers in the Pentagon, and his
willingness to bring up the subject of civilian officials throwing their
weight around caused a certain amount of uneasiness in the office of the
Secretary of Defense.
As time passed, it became clear that there was an irreconcilable
personality clash between the Secretary and the Chief of Naval Operations.
Both were strong willed and neither feared the other. Clearly Mr. McNamara
was Admiral Anderson's superior, and there was no doubt whom the Presi-
dent would support if it came to that sort of decision.
Anderson lasted two years, and his experience during the Cuban mis-
sile crisis is illustrative of the low regard in which the service Chiefs
were held. First, there was an incident on October 6th. Defense offi-
cials decided to send a squadron of Navy fighters from the Naval Air
Station, Oceana, Virginia, to Key West, Florida, and to assign them tem-
porarily under the Air Force in conjunction with the Air Defense effort.
Deputy Defense Secretary Gilpatrick, without even advising the Navy De-
partment, called directly to CINCLANTFLT, Admiral Dennison, and ordered
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aim to transfer the squadron.
As the Cuban crisis intensified, the Navy established its quarantine
of Cuba, and Secretary McNamara became a frequent visitor to the Navy's
operation center, or Flag Plot. The room contained visual materials lo-
cating the position of all ships in the Atlantic fleet, along with com-
munications information and direct links to individual ships. McNamara
insisted in personally directing the operation from Flag Plot, and began
calling ship's commanders directly despite the tactful, but obvious pro-
test of Admiral Anderson. The Navy uses highly formal voice communications
with coded voice calls proceeding down through the chain of command.
McNamara belittled or ignored these command techniques. On one occasion
he pointed to a symbol denoting the position of one of the ships in the
quarantine which showed it to be somewhat out of position and demanded of
Admiral Anderson, "What's that ship doing there?". "I don't know," replied
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the Admiral, "but I have faith in my officers". The ship in question
had generated a submarine contact using a highly classified system of
underwater detection and was prosecuting its contact. Admiral Anderson
knew that some of the members of both his staff and McNamara' s party were
not cleared for this sensitive information. Later, CNO was able to ex-
plain the situation to the Secretary, which calmed him somewhat. Later,
however, McNamara intimated to his confidants that it appeared to him that
the CNO obviously didn't need any civilian help and had little time to
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answer questions, even from the Secretary of Defense..
The final break took place over the TFX project. McNamara insisted
that all services endorse the multiservice aircraft and Admiral Anderson
staunchly refused. Regardless of who was right or wrong, he had opposed
the Secretary on too many issues and his dismissal was inevitable. Mr.
Sorensen relates that,
...Anderson had overstepped the bounds of dissent with Kennedy and
McNamara on more than one issue, and the meaning of his departure
was not lost on his fellow brass; but his many backers in the Con-
gress were unable to make out a case of martyrdom when Kennedy put
his considerable talents to use by naming him Ambassador to Portu-
gal.4 4
Strained as the relation between SECDEF and CNO may have been, there
is no evidence that the relationship between the President and his Navy
Chief were ever anything but cordial. Anderson never publicly criticized
the President and always loyally carried out his wishes. The President
and his CNO obviously liked each other personally, but were separated by
a conflict of viewpoint. Anderson stood up for what he thought was the
right course of action for the Navy and the President really had no choice
but to back up his Secretary of Defense. Thus Admiral Anderson became
the second member of the JCS to retire after only one term. Later, how-
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ever, General LeMay would have his second term cut short by one year.
LBJ and the JCS
When Lyndon B. Johnson became President of the United States, he







military. As a long time member of the Armed Services Committee, Johnson
had developed attitudes about the military similar to those of Truman.
Generally he stereotyped the military leaders as militaristic and extra-
vagant: "The Generals know only two words —•. spend and bomb." During
the Johnson administration, the JCS would be kept busy training and equip-
ping troops and transporting them to Southeast Asia, but they would not
be called upon to act as the President's principal military advisers.
They would be called upon to carry out military and political decisions
reached in the White House between the President and a small group of
civilian advisers.
Hugh Sidey, a Time-Life reporter who covered the White House during
the Johnson presidency provides a comprehensive insight into Johnson's
thoughts about the military in general. In his book, "A Very Personal
Presidency", Sidney reports:
His deep suspicions of the military went back to his first days in
the Congress .. .he was given a seat on Carl Vinson's powerful Naval
Affairs Committee. There he watched the high brass parade, and he
was disturbed. He found that too many military men grew arrogant
behind the ribbons they wore on their chests. He found them contem-
ptuous of new ideas, mean and thoughtless in dealing with those
below them. He detected an alarming amount of sheer stupidity
which is self-perpetuating because of the academy caste system.
He found no companionship with military men... In fact, the general
level of competence which Johnson found among the admirals who came
before the Naval Affairs Committee convinced him that the nation
could not put its complete trust in the military in such hazardous
times. How America met the threat had to be planned in detail, in
Johnson's view, by the politicians.^'
Apparently this lack of confidence in the military remained with
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the military were too narrow-minded in their determinations of courses of
action in resolving problems, and they never considered the political im-
plications. Johnson was merciless when discussing the performance of his
JCS privately and none of his Chiefs received more berating than General
LeMay, USAF Chief of Staff under both JFK and LBJ . LeMay was credited
with saying, in conjunction with advice on the conduct of the air war in
North Vietnam, "We ought to bomb them back into the Stone Age."
Johnson heartily endorsed an axiom which President Kennedy had pro-
pounded to several of his close friends one evening. Sitting in his of-
fice, shortly before his death, JFK said,
Once you decide to send the bombers, you want men like LeMay
flying them. But you can't let them decide if they should go
or not. 49
As President Johnson assumed office, he inherited a decision-making
structure which had been modified to meet the desires and personal pre-
ferences of his predecessor, who had been vitally interested in foreign
affairs. The apparatus of the National Security Council had been scrapped
and decision-making was accomplished through a number of small ad hoc
groups of flexible composition. Similarly, the JCS influence had been
eroded and the military input was provided by Secretary McNamara or other
civilian advisers.
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affairs, had inherited an organization for decision-making in that area
which had been made deliberately loose and flexible by President Kennedy
who had a broad knowledge, intuitive grasp and determined initiative in
that field. This inheritance, according to Townsend Hoopes,
...adversely affected both the scope of deliberations on Vietnam
policy and the quality of President Johnson's decisions from the
fall of 1964 onwards, and showed itself in the structural weaknesses
of the National Security Council and in inadequate attention to
longer range policy planning. The principal results were fragmen-
ted debate, loose coordination, and an excessive concentration on
problems of the moment.
Given Johnson's relative lack of expertise in foreign affairs, he
elected to retain many of the Kennedy advisers including Rusk and Rostov.
Considering Johnson's uncertainty and the same set of advisers, it is
understandable that Johnson would set the same course outlined by JFK.
Moreover, the presidential election lay ahead and a policy of "Let us
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continue" was the politically expedient one. As the conflict intensi-
fied, the Vietnam war occupied more and more of Johnson's thinking and in
order to deal with the subject, the "Tuesday Vietnam War for Lunch Bunch"
was instituted. Each week, almost without fail, the President and his
senior advisers gathered for lunch and deliberation in the President's
Dining Room in the White House. The agenda was always some aspect of the
Vietnam war.
Every President has had his personal preferences as to how he will
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service leaders and through his own military Chief of Staff, Admiral
Leahy. Truman worked through the JCS and when General MacArthur started
making foreign policy, the President, supported by the JCS, relieved him.
Kennedy, although using the JCS very little, nonetheless had his own per-
sonal military adviser, General Taylor, who was always close at hand.
But only under pressure from Congress did Johnson admit the military to
the war planning councils at all.
When Johnson initiated his Tuesday sessions, it was notable that there
were no military included. The group was usually composed of Secretaries
Rusk and McNamara, Special Assistant Walt Rostow and, at first, Press
Secretary Bill Moyers, later replaced by George Christian. This was the
most powerful policy-making group in the administration for the eighteen
month period in which it functioned. Both long-range plans and small tac-
tical details were discussed. On one occasion, Johnson was studying tar-
geting maps, deciding not only what targets were to be hit, but also pre-
scribing the type and amount of ordinance to be delivered. The following
week, relations with Red China might be the subject and other meetings
might find the group discussing the quality of battle rations being served
the fighting units in the forward areas. The military agenda was com-
piled by McNamara personally, and it was assumed he spoke for the consol-
54idated opinion of the military services.
Theoretically, the JCS provided their inputs in the National Security
Council sessions, but, by this time, the NSC had ceased to be a policy





could seek audiences with the President whenever they wanted, but in ef-
fect this resulted in putting the Secretary of Defense on report and re-
taliation could be effected in any number of ways such as cut-backs in
funds for a particular program or early retirement.
In 1967, as Johnson's popularity began to drop to a new low and the
Vietnam war was going badly, he began to receive Congressional criticism
for his failure to heed the advice of his military commanders. Finally,
after a series of military men testified before John Stennis' Armed Ser-
vices Committee and when Stennis himself objected that military advice was
being ignored, Johnson altered the composition of the Tuesday meetings to
include General Wheeler, who had relieved General Taylor as Chairman of
the JCS, and subsequently generals and admirals began appearing at the
Tuesday meetings with greater frequency. Moreover, Johnson resorted,
as Truman had done, to using his military leaders in an "advocate" role
by demonstrating that his policies were supported by the military. In
the winter of 1967-68 he summoned General Westmoreland to address a joint
session of the Congress concerning recommended policies in Vietnam.
Johnson emphasized that his policies were in accord with the advice given
by General Westmoreland, although it appears that Westmoreland had little
to do substantively with the policies and was acting in more of an
"advocate" role.
While Johnson's token gestures to make the military more a part of






it did little to alter the decision-making process and Johnson and four
or five of his most trusted civilian advisers continued to make the crucial
decisions. Press Secretary Moyers told a White House historian that Pres-
ident Johnson relied less on military advice .than any president since
Woodrow Wilson. (Military advice in this context meaning advice from the
military)
.
Because of the sad experience of the Bay of Pigs, President Kennedy
had a war room installed in the White House from which the President
could personally direct his war efforts. It was used during the Cuban
missile crisis and Johnson subsequently used it to personally direct the
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Vietnam war effort.
The military was dismayed by the extreme control exercised by the
President in directing the air war in Vietnam. Not only did Johnson make
the tactical decisions usually made by the field commanders, but his policy
of gradualism was in opposition to the policy recommended by the Chiefs.
In 1965, when the bombing campaign became a major effort, the Chiefs had
submitted a list of some ninety-four key targets which were selected in
accordance with the air doctrines of mass, momentum and concentration to
maximize the shock effects of air power to the fullest. North Vietnam
was in a vulnerable position. Her defenses were weak. Her fuel storage,
electric power complexes, transportation and other vital targets were
concentrated and vulnerable. The rapid destruction of these key targets
would, at the very least, have impeded material aid to the Viet Cong and








The bombing strategy designed by President Johnson undoubtedly had
some effect on the North Vietnamese, but there was no real stoppage of
the infiltration of men and material into South Vietnam.
The President was supported in his view by both McNamara and Taylor,
who wanted to test their theory of flexible response, which in effect was
to apply just as much pressure as needed to persuade the enemy to abandon
their goals. In essence, the President borrowed the hardware from the
services to make the strikes, but did not utilize that hardware in accor-
dance with the doctrine and tactics necessary to make it effective.
As the public became more disillusioned with the Vietnam war and the
military frustrations increased, Congressional members tried more and more
to intercede with the President to change his policy. During one of the
bombing halts, one of the influential senators pointedly told the Presi-
dent that he had to go all out to "win this thing now", even if it meant
going "for the jugular". He pleaded with Johnson to turn the conduct of
the war over to the military experts whose business it was to wage war.
Johnson's reply was both immediate and resolute:
Not as long as I am President. As long as I sit here, the control
will stay with the Commander-in-Chief. *
The senator persisted, saying that the reason Roosevelt and Truman
were great Presidents was because they let the military do their job.
Again Johnson responded emphatically,
I was around in those days. There were not many decisions made





everything closely. .. I'm not going to let the hounds loose.
Paradoxically, while President Johnson exercised tight control over
the bombing, he seemed mor-e content to allow his field commander, General
Westmoreland, and later General Abrams to conduct the ground war without
presidential guidance. Unfortunately, however, the gradualism, as es-
poused by the President, was not compatible with the war of attrition
which was being fought on the ground.
Having spent considerable time on President Kennedy and President
Johnson in this examination of civil-military relations, it is useful at
this point to turn to the role played by Robert McNamara who, under both
Kennedy and Johnson, served longer as Secretary of Defense than any other
man in the history of that office. During his tenure, the combined might
of all the military forces of the U.S. rose to its highest point since
WWII and at the same time, the influence of the military generally and
the JCS specifically sank to an all-time low.
Prior to his brief tour in the military during WWII, Mr. McNamara
spent most of his adult life as a student or school teacher. After WWII,
he went to work for the Ford Motor Company, where, after fourteen years,
he was selected as the first "non-Ford" President of that company.
While, he was working his way to the Presidency at Ford, there were a num-
ber of changes occurring in the Pentagon which would set the stage for
him to dominate the JCS just as he had dominated the staff at Ford.
These changes are directly related to the influence of the military in
strategic decision-making and are worthwhile considering at this point.
60ibid.
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Ironically, the high water mark of JCS influence occurred during WWII
when the JCS did not officially exist. President Roosevelt put such trust
and confidence in the Chiefs that he avoided issuance of a formal defi-
nition of their duties and functions arguing that a formal charter might
impede them in their efforts in bringing the war to a speedy and success-
A 9
ful conclusion. This complete freedom of action was reflected in a
statement made by Admiral Leahy near the end of the war. When asked to
comment on the restrictions under which he was working, he replied can-




Beginning with the National Security Act of 1947, the role of the
JCS began to be prescribed and circumscribed. As the external threat
posed by the expansionist policies of the Soviet Union grew, there were
serious and honest disagreements about the method of containing the threat.
Naturally, this controversy was focused in the JCS as the Chiefs tried to
determine a best overall national military strategy. Fairly or unfairly,
this lack of consensus caused a deep concern around Washington that the
Chiefs were ineffective as an advisory body. There was a saying in Wash-
ington that "...the Congress debates, the Supreme Court deliberates, but
the Joint Chiefs bicker". In an effort to minimize this bickering effect
on national defense policy, the Congress and Executive took several steps
to increase the authority and control of the Secretary of Defense over
the service commands.
62Samuel Huntington, "Power, Expertise and the Military Profession,"




The National Security Act Amendments which were based largely on the
recommendations of Secretary of Defense Forrestal and were reinforced by
the first Hoover Commission Report, created a Department of Defense where
only a coordinating body had existed. The Secretary, although strength-
ening his position, was still forbidden by law to encroach upon the combat
functions assigned to the separate military services. Congress used this
device to maintain the individual services, as it did again in subsequent
reorganizations in 1953 and 1958. Nevertheless, this restriction has
become less limiting on the authority of the Secretary of Defense as major
strategic decisions have turned on problems of weapons development and
financial management rather than directly on the controversy over roles
and mxssxons.
The reorganization plan of 1953 went another step further in cen-
tralizing civilian control by taking the JCS out of the chain of command
so that it ran from the President to the Secretary of Defense through the
civilian service secretaries directly to the commanders on the field.
Additionally, several assistant Secretaries of Defense positions were
created in functional areas such as supply, logistics, manpower and per-
sonnel. These posts were established as staff functions as advisers to
the Secretary which in no way were meant to interpose another layer of
civilian control between the services and the Secretary of Defense. How-
ever, in practice, the assistant Secretaries were often in a position to
oppose the service viewpoint. Thus, rather than assisting the services
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in their functional roles, the assistant Secretaries in fact added another
dimension to civilian control.
The reorganization of 1958 contained far-reaching consequences for
the military which, in effect, brought about a de facto unification of the
armed forces within the framework of a three departmental system. Under
this Act, the Secretary of Defense was given the authority to exercise
direct control over unified commands, transfer weapons systems from one
service to another and maintain centralized direction of all military re-
search and development through the Director of Research and. Engineering.
The practical impact of these powers was to give the Secretary of Defense
considerable influence over the roles and missions of the services which
were still prescribed by law within the broad and flexible categories of
land, air and sea forces. The individual service secretaries were taken
out of the chain of command and the JCS were given operational responsi-
bility for the unified and specified commands, but were specifically for-
bidden any executive authority. The scope of the Chairman's duties was
increased, giving him more influence over his fellow members, but at the
same time a formal restraint was placed on easy communications between
the JCS and Congress. Free communcations with the President was inhibited
by the chain of command. However, this increasing authority of civilian
over the military was not granted without some misgivings within the
civilian sector itself. Several aspects were viewed with concern: the
turnover of civilians in the Pentagon; the inability of civilians to come
to grips with problems which have no exact parallel outside the military
establishment; the tendency for the Defense Department to evolve into a
fourth operating agency of the military establishment; the pre-occupation
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of Defense officials with budgetary matters; and delays in military pro-
grams as a result of the need to obtain clearances from a thickening layer
of "functional" civilian secretaries. This buildup of civilian control
caused Senator Henry Jackson to comment that- "at one time we worried
about a German General Staff setup in the Pentagon. I think we are at
the point of a civilian general staff..."
Despite the increased control provided for by the 1958 reorganization,
doubt still existed about the adequacy of civilian control exercised in
the Department of Defense and, in particular, about the ability of the
Secretary of Defense to control effectively such a large and complex or-
ganization. In 1961, a pre- inauguration task force was formed by President
Kennedy to investigate the civilian-military relationship in the Depart-
ment of Defense. The core of the task force report is capsulized in the
following excerpt from that report:
Throughout all proposals, past and present, to make more effective
the DOD organization has run one central theme — the clarification
and strengthening of the authority of the Secretary of Defense over
the entire United States military establishment. There are some
who believed even prior to the 1958 amendment of the National Se-
curity Act that existing legislation provided ample basis for the
Secretary's authority. Others took a contrary view. It is the con-
clusion of this committee that the doctrine of civilian control
will be compromised as long as doubt exists on this point. 67
Concerned by the task force report, Kennedy directed his Secretary
of Defense, Robert McNamara, to clarify and strengthen the role of the
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Seizing the initiative and armed with the requisite backing of Pres-
ident Kennedy, Secretary McNamara began to bring all activities in the
Defense Department under his own control. Central to this effort was Mr.
McNamara' s conviction that,
The direction of the Department of Defense demands not only a strong,
responsible civilian control, but a Secretary's role that consists
of active, imaginative and decisive leadership of the establishment
at large, and not the passive practices of simply refereeing the
disputes of traditional and partisan factions.""
The first step was to change the rules by which decisions about
military strategy and procurement were made, and basically this was done
by McNamara' s introduction of the systems analysis approach. McNamara
and his staff of systems analysts felt that the military leaders relied
too much on their judgment and experience as a basis for decisions. The
generals and admirals felt that some things could not be quantified and
had to be decided on the basis of judgment and experience. Throughout the
McNamara era the battle revolved around which items could be quantified
and which ones could not.
The outcome of this struggle was vital to the future roles the gene-
rals and admirals were to play in strategic decision-making. Systems
analysis had already proven itself to be a useful management tool, and its
future was assured, but such was not the case for the generals and admi-
rals. If almost every facet of decision-making could be quantified and
rationalized mathematically, then there was really no need for the mili-
tary leaders except to exercise command in the field. If judgment and
experience were to be relegated to a minor role in the decision-making
CO
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process, then the generals and flag rank officers were not needed anymore
at the highest levels of the defense establishment, since it is primarily
because of their judgment and experience that they hold their positions
in the defense staff.
Traumatic as the McNamara experience was, it was not without a cer-
tain amount of benefit to the military. Probably the most positive con-
tribution made by McNamara to military strength and readiness was that
he forced the services to examine the basic logic concerning why they
69
wanted certain hardware and programs.
It took the military a while to learn the new rules, but before long
each service had formed its own systems analysis branch, who were just as
capable as the ones in the DOD . Additionally, the services learned that
by using certain assumptions, one could make the answers come out most any
way that was desired. Reports of this practice on the part of DOD an-
alysts began to circulate and McNamara' s spell over the Congress began to
end. Perhaps the best example of both the manipulation of assumptions
and the struggle for existence by the military leaders can be found in
the TFX project.
Both the Navy and the Air Force needed a new attack aircraft, a new
air-superiority aircraft, a new interceptor, and new reconnaisance air-
craft. According to McNamara, one aircraft could be built to perform
all these missions and at a great savings. There were three major stum-
bling blocks which prevented the accomplishment of this goal, however.
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First, the Navy needed an aircraft which was stressed for carrier
operations, able to withstand catapult launches and arrested landings,
and the Air Force needed an aircraft suitable for field operations,
stressed in different areas and able to operate in a dust and debris
filled environment which is absent on a carrier deck. Second, the
state of the art was not advanced enough to permit the incorporation of
all the needed capabilities in one air-frame that anyone could reasonably
be expected to maintain. Third, and perhaps the most insurmountable, was
the animosity caused by the Secretary telling the services that they
must combine everything into one airplane, telling them exactly how it
was to be used, telling them they must all use the same airplane, and
telling them just which manufacturer was going to build it. Before
the episode was over, the TFX became extremely complicated by charges of
intellectual corruption on the part of DOD analysts and there were rumors
of political manipulation concerning the procedure whereby the contract
was awarded to General Dynamics over Boeing. In the final analysis, the
military view was vindicated when it turned out that the TFX could not do
what DOD and General Dynamics said it would do and when it cost more than
twice what DOD said it would. The Navy found the aircraft to be in-
compatible with carrier operations and the Air Force Tactical Command
found it to be no match for what was known about Russian fighters already
in production. Finally, it was forced upon the Strategic Air Command as
72
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If the TFX was illustrative of the struggle for supremacy in the
Pentagon, then its failure was an example of the consequences of ignor-
ing the advice of the professional military. There was no solace for
anyone concerning the TFX, and at best it was a Pyrrhic victory for
the JCS.
McNamara and the JCS would continue to struggle, but in almost
every case the Secretary would be the winner as long as he enjoyed the
strong backing of the President. Never before had a Secretary of Defense
enjoyed such rapport with and unqualified backing from the White House.
McNamara once observed,
I couldn't accomplish anything over here without
Presidential support. It is absolutely fundamental.
I wouldn't and couldn't stay here one minute without
it. 73
When White House aides pointed the finger at the JCS after the Bay
of Pigs, McNamara waited a week before he made a formal statement and
then it was a half-hearted rebuttal. When General Lemnitzer pointed
out that the time frame given the JCS to consider McNamara' s directive
on the development in space was unrealistic and would not allow time for
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a comprehensive answer, he was ignored. When McNamara and Admiral
Anderson clashed, Anderson went to Portugal.
The conflict was not all one-sided, however. In addition to their
lessons in systems analysis, the Chiefs soon learned that McNamara was
able to capitalize on splits in their ranks. When they were divided, he
would carry the day by pointing out the division to the President and
Congress. When General Wheeler replaced General Taylor as Chairman of







Secretary. He would tell the other Chiefs that he would not adjourn
the meeting until they could reach an agreement. The united front
eventually paid off for the JCS, for even McNamara was hesitant about
overruling a united or common professional opinion. Consequently, such
items as a nuclear carrier and the ABM, which the Secretary opposed for
about five years, were finally approved. Khile this imposed consensus
resulted in increased strength in the JCS, it detracted from the model
relationship which calls for "understanding between the civil representa-
tives of the State and leaders of the Armed Forces in order to coordinate
national policy with the power to enforce it." This understanding could
hardly take place when alternate plans and strategies were not even avail-
able to the civilian leaders. A forced consensus replaced military
advice and honest difference of opinion— a consensus the Chiefs felt
they needed to protect them from the "divide and conquer" tactics of the
Secretary of Defense.
Despite difficulties, disagreements and almost open warfare between
the DOD staff and the JCS and service staffs, Mr. McNamara continued to
meet with the JCS almost every Monday afternoon. As time went on, the
discussions became less and the silences grew longer until toward the
end of McNamara 's reign, he and the Chiefs just sat around the table and
looked at each other across a silent gulf that had grown too wide to be
bridged.
On behalf of the Secretary, there is no reason to question he dedica-
tion nor his loyalty and patriotism. Much of what he did for the
Lawrence Korb, "The Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff,"
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military was beneficial, but his abrupt managerial methods, his lack
of understanding of the values held by the military and his chilling
personality prevented him from accomplishing all that he could have,
and many of his changes failed to last through his tenure.
President Nixon and the JCS
Shortly after his inauguration, Richard Nixon appointed a "Blue
Ribbon Defense Panel" to study the "entire organization, structure, and
-ic.
operation of the Department of Defense," the first comprehensive
study undertaken since those performed by the Hoover Commission. Like
the Hoover Commission, one of the primary concerns of the Panel was that
civilian control should be clearly dominant in the formulation of
national policy and that the civilian control of the military establish-
ment must be clearly established and firmly maintained. In what appeared
to be a contradictory statement, the Panel found that effective civilian
control was impaired by a generally excessive centralization of decision-
making authority in the office of the Secretary of Defense. This comment
points out, however, that, considering Laird's philosophy of decentraliza-
tion, the organization which he inherited was structured for centralization
and did not provide him with the proper controls for effective supervision
of major policy decisions.
Included in the Panel's findings were two points which are relevant
here: too many layers of both civilian and military staffs and that staffs
were too large from the office of the Secretary of Defense, the military
departments extending down through the field commands, the Joint Chiefs of
1 (\
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Staff and the Unified and Component Commands; and an erosion of the
effectiveness of the JCS as presidential advisers due to their "three
hatted" role of (1) supervisors of their individual services, (2) partici-
pants in the advisory and planning functions assigned by statute to the
JCS, and (3) as members of the Secretary's staff for matters of operational
command relative to the Unified and Specified Commands.
The Panel recommended that, in order to alleviate the Chiefs of their
responsibility as operational advisers in the case of the Unified and
Specified Commands, a Deputy Secretary of Defense (Operations) be instituted
with its own joint operations staff, and that inerposed between the Deputy
and the Unified and Specified Commands should be a Strategic Command, a
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Tactical Command and a Logistics Command. Indeed, such a move would take
pressure off the Chiefs. But at the same time, it would add to the increas-
ing amount of civilian and military layers of control which the Panel also
found undesirable.
The Panel found that the military influence was not as effective as
it could be in policy-making. The President and the Secretary of Defense
did not, the Panel felt, have the opportunity to consider all viable
options as background for making major decisions because, partially as a
carryover from the McNamara era, differences of opinion were submerged or
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compromised at lower levels of the DOD and especially in the JCS.
When James Forrestal became the first Secretary of Defense, he envisioned
a staff of about 15 to 25 men. One of the Panel's recommendations was that













Although there were no major organizational changes implemented
in the DOD, the Nixon administration appears to have established a
pattern of civilian-military relations which reverses that of the
Kennedy and Johnson administrations. Secretary Melvin Laird
granted the military more autonomy and reduced the role of civilian
staffers, unlike McNamara and Clark Clifford, who kept the uniformed
military on a comparatively tight rein and permitted civilian defense
staffs to flourish. Simultaneously, Henry Kissinger's highly structured
National Security Council and the new Defense Policy Review Committee,
suggest that President Nixon substituted rigorous civilian institu-
tional procedures for the rigid civilian systems analysis of his pre-
decessors, as his means of assuring civilian control. Due to its
potential power and significance, it is useful to comment here on the
Defense Policy Review Committee, established by President Nixon in 1969.
The DPRC was brought into existence, according to one observer, because
of some relatively minor foreign policy problem which was created for the
President by the unconsidered consequences of a force reduction which had
been ordered earlier in 1969. Another observer believes that the DPRC was
created by a suggestion from Secretary Laird, who felt that he could not
provide adequate guidance within the Pentagon on the matter of defense
budgeting unless he knew how defense matters were regarded in terms of
priorities within the entire Federal budget context. But, whatever the
origins of the DPRC, its functions and missions are staggering. Its





and social implications, both foreign and domestic, resulting from any
changes in defense spending, budgeting, force levels, and related
considerations, trying to assess trade-offs between domestic and foreign
programs. This really strikes at the heart of everything— the $64 question-
the overall assignment of priorities. If the DPRC works as it is
apparently designed to work, it will be the first time in American history
that any person or group short of the President himself has been assigned
to the task of looking at all policy problems of the United States ranging
across the whole spectrum from domestic to foreign.
Membership in the DPRC includes Dr. Henry Kissinger, the Deputy
Secretary of Defense, the Undersecretary of State, the Chairman of the
JCS, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, and the Chairman of the
O 1
President's Council of Economic Advisers.
Most powerful new units of government seem to arouse resentment and
suspicion from the military, but the JCS appears pleased with the DPRC.
Having the JCS Chairman on the Committee gives the DOD two representatives
against only one for each of the several agencies. Moreover, this position
gives the Chairman of the JCS a second membership on a very high-level
decision-making body within the White House context. (He also sits on the
NSC Undersecretary's Committee).
Military leaders have generally felt more optimistic toward the Nixon
administration than they had felt duirng the Kennedy and Johnson admini-
strations. They feel that Secretary Laird has exhibited a personality
81
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style which is more to their liking, despite reductions in the defense
budget. And, although President Nixon does not confer directly with
the JCS nor have his personal military adviser, they feel adequately
represented at top White House levels through some of the channels
already discussed. Nevertheless, there were some major challenges posed
by the Nixon administration. The first challenge was that the JCS had
an opportunity to be intimately involved in making the defense budget,
and obviously national military policy at a key stage. The pitfall to
be avoided was that they could not appear before Congress, blaming their
financial difficulties on the OSD. It appears to date that this pitfall has
been avoided.
A second pitfall lay in the opportunity to fall into the interservice
rivalry which was prevalent during the McNamara era. This potential problem
is magnified in the face of continually decreasing defense budgets. This
problem has not surfaced to any alarming degree, although the fiscal
1973 budget has somewhat alleviated the pressure, especially for the Navy.
More importantly, however, the climate provided by the Nixon-Laird
administration has not been conducive to the inter-service rivarly as it
had been in the early days of the Kennedy-McNamara administration.
Conclusions
The lack of understanding which existed between -the civil representa-
tives of the State and the leaders of the Armed Forces was clearly evident
from 1961 to 1968. Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, though different in
many ways, both shared a certain distrust of the opinions of the JCS.
McNamara challenged the military on their home ground and placed them on
the defensive. It is unfortunate that this serious internal conflict
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occurred at a time when decisions were made that committed the prestige
and power of the United States in a new and frustrating manner. While
the intentions of the men involved—Presidents, Secretary of Defense, and
the Chiefs—were obviously the best, the result of the strained relation-
ship between the civilian and military leaders of the U.S. has had a
serious effect on national security.
If genuine civil control over the military is the ideal, and this
paper takes the position that it is, then the President and the Congress
not only are obliged to define the role of the military, but also to
protect the role of the military. The military probably is better
equipped to defend the nation than it is itself.
The military is likely to play whatever role is allotted to it by
civil authority regardless of how it sees its own role; however, it is
difficult for senior military officers to keep from entering the political
arena when the opportunity to do so is clearly available.
Very few American Presidents have the background to prepare them for
responsibility of becoming the nation's grand strategist. The wise Presi-
dent seeks the counsel of his military leaders. He is not compelled to
accept their advice, but he should, at least, listen and further, it
seems that he should insist that the military observe the precepts of
their profession and offer "purely" military advice.
The civil-military environment in which the JCS operated during the
Kennedy-Johnson era was marked by degrees of prejudice, pride and arrogance,
The attitudes and actions of both Presidents Kennedy and Johnson were
affected by their prejudices regarding the military. The friction that
grew between McNamara and the Joint Chiefs grew largely from McNamara's
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pride and intellectual arrogance, and to a lesser extent, from the
arrogance of certain of his Chiefs.
In the final analysis, it is the President and the Congress who
should determine the role of force in each situation, but the military
can best define the capability of that force to achieve the stated
policy objectives. It is the duty of the civilian leaders to apply
military power correctly, and correspondingly, it is the duty of the
military to carefully state the capabilities of its forces and to make it
clear in a given situation just what the forces can and cannot be expected
to accomplish. Unfortunately, the Kennedy and Johnson administrations saw
neither the need for, nor the merit of independent professional military
advice on policy matters which were fundamentally military in nature.
The Nixon administration, however, has reversed this trend. Nixon
has made it clear through his Secretaries of Defense, Laird and Richardson
that the military input is encouraged in the decision-making process in a
meaningful way. This will require the JCS to think in broad and strategic
terms. Military leaders were not ready and able to do this after WWII,
and civilian strategists filled the vacuum in designing and elaborating
the basic concepts
—
primarily the notions of deterrence and containment
—
which guided overall American military policy until at least 1960. Then,
in the early 1960's, President Kennedy and Secretary McNamara tended to
sidetrack the military leaders in favor of personal advisers. Therefore,
the military leaders in 1970 had experienced a quarter of a century in
which they were seldom afforded an opportunity or much encouragement to
think in broad, strategic terms. President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger have
indicated a desire to think in such terms and they have openly invited the
military to participate. The opportunity to the military leaders to return
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